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Modern societies are characterized by competing organizations that 
rely predominantly on incentive schemes to align the behavior of 
their members with the organizations’ objectives. This study 
contributes to explaining why in so many cases incentive schemes 
have gradually crowded out cooperation as an organization device. 
Our explanation does not draw on free-riding, the obvious Achilles’ 
heel of cooperation, but relies completely on fundamental group 
contest mechanisms. By investigating a canonical rent seeking model 
and adopting an evolutionary perspective, the analysis identifies 
shortcomings in previous results, sets the record straight, and 
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THE EVOLUTION OF SHARING RULES IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS: 
INCENTIVES CROWD OUT COOPERATION 
 
1. Introduction  
Humans are inherently competitive. “Homo rivalis” competes for resources, mates, sports 
trophies, and even artistic and professional recognition. How contestants act out their 
competitive instincts depends on the prevailing cultural environment (cf. Chen and Tang 
2009). Humans are, however, also social animals. A key canonical form of human interaction 
is therefore the group contest. Competition between groups takes place, for example, when, in 
an international river basin, riparian tribes dispute property rights to water (cf. Ansink and 
Weikard 2009). Competition between groups does of course not exclude competition within 
these groups; intra-group competition takes, for example, the form of advancement contests in 
private enterprises (the classical paper is Lazear and Rosen 1981) and public bureaucracies 
(cf. Kahana and Liu 2010). This paper analyzes inter-group contests in the presence of intra-
group competition.  
The rules that govern intra-group contests depend on the organization of the group. In a world 
in which groups do not exhibit even rudiments of organization, the group members -- even 
though they share common interests -- behave in a non-cooperative manner. This is Hobbes’s 
war of all against all.  Overcoming the Hobbesian jungle fortunately does not necessarily 
require a Leviathan.
1 Cooperation among strangers can also emerge from a general 
willingness to punish non-cooperative behavior. Such decentralized punishment does not 
presuppose high moral standards on the part of the punisher; it is present even in rather 
unpleasant societies of thugs, ruffians, and thieves who actually like to cheat (cf. Heller and 
Sieberg 2010). In more tightly organized societies, punishment may be centralised, whereas 
the flow of information on deviant behavior may still rely on decentralized whistle blowing 
(cf. Arce 2010).  
Cooperative behavior is, however, by no means the predominant form of intra-group 
interaction. Often, especially if the group’s objective requires the commitment of resources, 
more sophisticated instruments of group organization are employed. In order to elicit optimal 
effort on the part of all group members, the contested group-specific excludable good can, for 
example, be shared among the members according to their respective effort. This kind of 
incentive scheme evidently makes do with less solidarity among group members and with less 
                                                 
1 Hillman (2009) elaborates on how Hobbes backed his view of the role of the king (Leviathan) in the face of the 
misgivings put forward by the prophet Samuel.   2
monitoring effort applied by the group’s formateurs. In any event, incentives schemes 
arguable are the most important instrument of eliciting effort in modern organizations. 
I analyze how a group’s internal organization (which may differ from the opponent group’s 
mode of organization) impacts on the group’s external contest success. The insights gained 
from the analysis contribute to explaining the emergence of the ubiquitous use of incentive 
schemes in modern organizations. Our explanation has two novel aspects. First, it does not 
draw on the phenomenon of free-riding in large groups; it rather relies on mechanisms 
inherent in group contests that pit groups with different organizational schemes against one 
other. And second, it is couched in an evolutionary context that explains why it can take a 
long time for incentive schemes to crowd out cooperation. 
This study relates to a substantial literature on group contests. It is by now, for example, well 
understood how rent seeking for group-specific public goods gives rise to free-riding. 
Ursprung (1990) investigates the case of identical group members and congestible public 
goods and arrives at the result that small groups outperform large groups - an insight which is 
reminiscent of Olson (1965). Baik (2008) assumes asymmetric valuations of the prize across 
group members; he shows that when players are budget-constrained, low-valuation members 
free-ride on high-valuation players. Epstein and Mealem (2009) investigate the extent to 
which contest success can be increased by orchestrating group membership. Intra-group 
sharing-rules that provide incentives to contribute to group effort were introduced by Nitzan 
(1991). Cheikbossian (2008) compares cooperative behavior with non-cooperative behavior 
of the group members. Baik and Shogren (1995) explain the formation of groups and Hausken 
(2000) shows how cooperation among group members may emerge in inter-group contests. 
Experimental work indicates that intergroup competition can promote efficient behavior of 
group members: Riechmann and Weimann (2008), for example, focus on coordination 
problems within groups and Reuben and Tyran (2010) test whether intra-group cooperation 
can be promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked 
first. Konrad (2009: chapter 6) provides an encompassing state of the art survey of this 
literature.  
I investigate contests in which competing groups apply different intra-group organization 
schemes and sharing rules. In line with many contributions to the rent-seeking literature, the 
simplest set-up is employed, namely a two-group Tullock (1980) lottery contest with linear 
cost functions and symmetric valuation of the prize. I show in section 2 that intra-group 
cooperation in all respects dominates organization schemes that completely rely on   3
spontaneous individual contributions (non-cooperative behavior). Moreover, groups using 
incentive schemes do better than cooperating groups as far as contest success is concerned, 
but fare worse with respect to expected individual utility. In section 3 I show that in a 
population of groups in which cooperation is used to organize the within-group interaction, 
incentive schemes will nevertheless catch on, albeit in a protracted evolutionary bootstrapping 
process. I arrive at the conclusion that the forces inherent in group contests see to it that pure 
incentive schemes completely crowd out schemes relying on cooperation and incomplete 
incentivising. 
My analysis is closely related the literature that investigates the group sharing rule proposed 
by Shmuel Nitzan (1991) in this journal 20 year ago. Sanghack Lee (1995) endogenizes the 
choice of Nitzan’s sharing rule but his analysis has problems. In section 3 I employ an 
evolutionary narrative to formally reinvestigate Lee’s story line and show that even though 
the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium identified by Lee is correct (as has also be confirmed 
in a more general context by Ueda, 2002), establishing the equilibrium sharing rule may not 
be as straightforward as Lee’s analysis appears to convey. I rather show that the likely 
evolutionary process that eventually gives rise to the equilibrium sharing rule is protracted 
and takes time to run its course. More recent contributions deal with group contests in which 
the sharing rule of the opponent group is not observed (Baik and S. Lee 2007; Nitzan and 
Ueda 2010; Baik and D. Lee forthcoming).  
 
2. Pure types of group organization 
Consider two groups contesting a prize. Group k has nk identical risk-neutral members 
(k=1,2). The contest effort of member i of group k is denoted by xik. Total contest outlays of 







=∑ . Furthermore, assume the contest technology to be of the 
Tullock (lottery) variety with linear cost of effort and that everybody values the prize at V. If 
the groups are not organized, i.e., if the members of group k do not cooperate among each 
other, and the prize is shared equally among the group members of the successful group, the 
expected utility  1
N
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The respective expression for a representative member j of group 2 is symmetric. Instead of   4
interpreting the lottery outcome  11 12 () p XXX = + to represent the probability of winning, 
one could just as well interpret this expression to represent the share of the rent assigned by 
the contest to group 1. This isomorphism follows from assuming risk neutrality. The assumed 
contest technology is nevertheless rather special. Alternative specifications could, for 
example, assume a generalized logit contest success function (as in Epstein and Mealem 
2009), a completely discriminating contest as pioneered in the rent-seeking literature by 
Hillman and Samet (1987) and Hillman and Riley (1989) and applied to group contests by 
Konrad (2004), a dynamic framework that takes into account that many prizes endure over 
time and may have to be re-contested (as in Aidt and Hillman 2008), or even asymmetric 
information (as in Ryvkin 2010).  
If the group members cooperate as, for example, in a soccer team, the expected utility  1 i EU  
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Cooperation is thus meant to imply that the gain and the pain (i.e., the prize and the effort) are 
shared equally among the group members. Whether all group members will truly exert the 
same effort in cooperation is of course always uncertain. Because of this moral hazard 
problem, enforcing perfect cooperation is notoriously difficult. Assuming that only a fraction 
[ ] 0,1 q∈  of the members cooperate, the expected utility of the co-operators is reduced 







C X X V
EU
X Xn q n
=−
+
.          ( 1 C) 
Notice that the parameter q is assumed to be the same for both groups. It can also be 
interpreted to measure cost-efficiency in sustaining cooperation, costless enforcement of 
cooperation being portrayed by q=1.  
The third archetype of group organization uses incentive schemes to elicit private effort xik. 
The standard example for such a contest is competition among business firms whose 
employees are remunerated according to performance. Following the seminal study of sharing 
rules in group contests by Nitzan (1991), one can portray the intricate intra-group and inter-
group interactions of a group that uses this incentive scheme as follows (I signifies incentive 













.      ( 1 I) 
This representation implies that each member obtains the share of the prize that corresponds 
to the share of his or her contribution to the group’s total effort.
2  
Allowing these three possible types of group organization, nine different kinds of contests 
need to be analyzed in a two-group contest model. To do so, the expected utility functions in 
the equations (1N), (1C) and (1I) are differentiated with respect to individual effort xik. 
Applying the symmetry condition xik=xk (for all i) after differentiation yields the following 







































         ( 2 I) 
Combining the reaction functions of the three types of group organization (N, C, I) with each 
other yields the nine Nash equilibria summarized in Table 1.
3 Table 1 reports the probability 
pk of group k ( k=1,2) winning the contest, the expected utility EUik of a representative 
member of the two competing groups, and total rent dissipation D=X1+X2 which has played a 
major role in the literature on rent-seeking contests.
4 Without loss of generality the valuation 
is set equal to unity (V=1). 
Comparing in Table 1 the entries in the NN-cell with those in the CN-cell (or the NC cell) 
shows that it is profitable to organize a group of agents who share a common interest. If group 
1 manages to get organized but group 2 remains unorganized, the probability p1 of group 1 
succeeding in the group contest increases from  21 2 () nnn +  to  22 (1 ) nn + . This increase in 
contest prowess is accompanied by an increase in the organized group members’ expected 
utility:  11
CN NN
ii EUE U >  (we assume here and in the following that the fraction q of co-operators 
                                                 
2 An alternative way of modelling the distribution of the spoils within the winning group is to stage a second 
rent-seeking contest among the members of the successful group. The respective classical paper is Katz and 
Tokatlidu (1996). 
3 The few free riders in the groups banking on cooperation do not contribute anything. We assume that the stake 
of these defectors does not influence the group’s choice of the mode of organization. 
4 A collection of ‘classical’ studies of rent-seeking contests is to be found in Congleton, Hillman and Konrad 
(2008). For a recent empirical study that measures rent dissipation in Europe, see Angelopoulos et al. (2009).   6
is large, i.e., close to unity).  Even though each member has to contribute more when 
cooperation is imposed,
5 this additional private cost is more than compensated by the 
increased likelihood of obtaining the shared prize. Thus, if the cost of organizing a group is 
sufficiently low, i.e., if q is sufficiently large, one would expect the group to become 
organized. Notice that total rent dissipation D increases as a consequence of this maneuver. 
This loss or waste of resources is reflected in a reduction of expected utility for the members 
of the unorganized group 2 who will therefore also consider becoming organized. In this they 
will certainly succeed because this shift from cell CN to cell CC is associated with an increase 
in expected contest success p2 and expected utility 2 j EU . Rent dissipation D again increases, 
implying that the members of group 1 will do worse when their opponent is organized.  
For sufficiently low costs of organization (q close to unity), cooperation thus becomes the 
preferred mode of within-group behavior. In terms of Table 1 this implies that escaping the 
Hobbesian jungle as portrayed by cell NN is simply a matter of evolutionary discovery. In 
other words, the society moves from NN to CC. The CC-regime is, however, not a Garden of 
Eden since cooperation is not universal but limited to the interaction between (most) members 
of the same group. Even though all groups eventually adopt the cooperative regime, the move 
from NN to CC thus does not increase the welfare of all; as a matter of fact, at least one group 
will lose and, if the group sizes are not too different, both of them will lose (the N-C game is 
then a prisoners’ dilemma). This is so because rent dissipation increases from 12 () Vn n + , i.e., 
the average stake of the individual contestant, to q 2 V , while the prize remains constant.  
The model thus suggests that when competing organizations can choose whether to have 
intra-group cooperation or not, the likely outcome is for both to adopt the cooperative regime. 
The following question then arises: is intra-group cooperation an evolutionary equilibrium or 
can at least one of the groups do better by adopting the pure incentive scheme described by 
equation (1I)? To answer this question we need to distinguish between two cases: costless or 
perfect cooperation (q=1) and the realistic case in which inducing cooperation is costly or less 
than perfect (q<1 or rather  (1 ) kk qn n ≤− , k=1,2).
6 Comparing the CC-cell in Table 1 with 
the IC (or CI) cell reveals that adopting the incentive scheme I increases the innovating 
group’s probability of winning the group contest. Thus, if the group formateur’s objective 
were to maximize the probability of winning (maybe because the group members use this as a 












6 Notice that the seeming discontinuity in the values (for q=1 and q<1) of the variables reported in the CI and IC 
cells of Table 1 derives from the fact that q is not a continuous variable.      7
measure of the formateur’s performance) the formateur would indeed introduce the incentive 
scheme I. Introducing the incentive scheme I does, on the other hand, reduce the expected 
utility of the innovating group:  11
CC IC
ii EUE U >  ( 22
CC CI
j j EUE U > ).
7 This result rather suggests that 
incentives would not be introduced in a situation in which both groups bank on cooperation. 
In the next section it is, however, shown that the cooperative regime CC is not a steady state: 




3. Bootstrapping incentive schemes  
Starting out from the CC regime, assume that group 1 is innovative and introduces the group 
sharing rule proposed by Nitzan (1991) and thoroughly re-investigated by Davis and Reilly 
(1999). This rule entails a convex combination of laissez faire (non-cooperation) and the pure 
incentive scheme I analyzed in the previous section. To keep the story line as simple as 
possible, assume now that both groups have the same number of members:  12 nnn == . For 
V=1, the expected utility  1
M
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,        ( 1 M) 
where  [ ] 0,1 a∈  denotes the relative weight given to equal distribution of the prize as compared 
to effort-related distribution, and the superscript M indicates that the group uses this mixed 
sharing rule. The non-cooperative group organization N is therefore characterized by a=1 and 
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.       ( 2 M) 
To see whether switching to the mixed incentive scheme pays off, combine (2M) with (2C) to 
arrive at the Nash equilibrium in the asymmetric contest in which group 1 adopts the mixed 
incentive scheme M and group 2 banks on cooperation. This exercise yields 
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,  ϕ  becomes zero, i.e., the co-operator group 2 will abstain from 
competing: X2=0.
8 In this case (2M) yields X1=q, and, according to (3), 
1 1 () ( 1 ) / == −
i
MC EU a a q n . Thus, for sufficiently well working groups of co-operators 
(q>3/4), it does not pay to adopt the mixed incentive scheme with aa =  since 
1 1 ()
i









This is, however, not the end of the story because making the opponent group surrender is not 
the best option here. Maximizing  1
MC
i EU in (3) with respect to the weight a yields the optimal 










. Substituting  * a into the expected utility 







MCC C EU a a EU
qn n
 for q<1. Group 1 may therefore 
adopt the mixed incentive scheme with the weight * a . Notice that even though assuming q<1 
is required at this stage to kick off the process, this assumption is innocuous since it is only 
used to destroy a knife-edge equilibrium, i.e., any value of q<1 arbitrarily close to 1 is 
sufficient to produce the sought-after result which would also arise from a trembling hand 
type of argument.
9  
Introducing the mixed incentive scheme with the weight a* thus increases the welfare of the 
members of the innovating group. It also increases the innovating group’s probability of 
winning the inter-group contest: p1 increases from ½ to 12 q . Incentivising individual 
contributions is advantageous because the mixed organization rule parameterized by the 
instrument variable a serves as a commitment device. Reducing a, i.e., providing more 
                                                 
8 Notice that  0 a >  for q<(n-1)/n, i.e., if at least two group members do not cooperate. 
9 Notice, that for small group sizes the largest q<1 may be substantially smaller than 1. Moreover, and more 
importantly, if the group sizes differ the assumption that q applies to both groups cannot be satisfied for small 
groups. Suppose, for example, that n1=2 and n2=3. The only values q can take for group 1 are 0.5 and 1, and for 
group 2 they are 1/3, 2/3 and 1 – so q cannot be the same for both groups if it is below 1. The analysis in section 
2 does therefore, strictly speaking, apply only to large groups, and also there only as an approximation. The 
above restriction n1=n2=n thus cannot easily be abandoned.   9
incentives, increases total contest outlays of group 1: 
1
12 X X ϕ
− =  (see equation 3 above). By 
manipulating a, the first group is thus in a position to control X1. Group 2 can also control 
total contest outlays, i.e., X2, but group 1, by establishing the organization scheme 
parameterized by a, has the advantage of being able to commit to a response to whatever 
group 2 decides to do. And this advantage translates into an increase in contest success.  
How group 2 will behave after group 1 has introduced the mixed incentive scheme a* 
depends on its decision-making routine. Assume group 2 to be unimaginative and to follow a 
strategy of copying the opponent group’s organization policy if that group happens to be more 
successful. Group 2 thus follows suit and adopts the mixed incentive scheme used by group 1. 
Will, by doing so, group 2 be better off and therefore stick with this new organization 
scheme? To answer this question one needs to solve the first-order condition (2M) for 
X1=X2=X because we now have perfect symmetry between the two groups: a1=a2=a*. 
Substituting the resulting X in the expected utility function (1M) yields 
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.      (4) 
The imitator group 2 will therefore adopt and stick with the incentive scheme a* after the 
innovative group 1 has done so. This result establishes that a transition from the cooperative 
regime CC to a regime in which both groups adopt a mixed incentive scheme M is likely to 
eventually take place even if the two groups adhere to simple behavioral strategies of groping.  
The next step is to show that the situation in which both groups adopt the same mixed 
incentive scheme M with weights a1=a2=a>0 is not an equilibrium: each of the two groups 
has an incentive to unilaterally decrease the weight ak given to equal sharing, i.e., each group 
k benefits from providing the organization scheme with some additional private incentives to 
contribute to the success of the group contest. To show that this is so, combine the reaction 
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If our innovative group 1 decreases the weight a1 on equal distribution too much, the members 
of the opposing group 2 will refrain from competing: X2=0. As can be seen from equation (5) 
this happens when 12 1( 1 ) aa n ≤ −− . If X2=0, the members of group 1 compete only among 
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.            ( 6 )  
If, on the other hand, 212 1( 1 ) aaa n >>− − , the members of group 2 remain active: X2>0. 
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Decreasing a1 from a1=a2 down to  12 1( 1 ) aa n = −− thus increases the expected utility 1
MM
i EU  
of group 1. Decreasing a1 further will, according to equation (6), decrease expected utility. 
The optimal strategy for group 1 is therefore to set  12 2 ()m a x ( 1 ( 1 ) , 0 ) aa a n = −− . If group 1 
implements this strategy, the utility of the members of group 2 will be zero, which is less than 
what they get if they copy their more successful opponent and also adopt the weight a1 (see 





E U aa an
n
=+ − >0. Starting out from a situation in which both 
groups adopt the mixed organization scheme M with the weights  12 aaa = =  one arrives at a 
situation in which both groups provide their organization with more incentives to contribute: 
12 1( 1 ) aaa n == − − . This competition to the bottom continues until a positive weight 
1( 1 ) an ≤−  is reached. The last step is then to move to a=0 which is equivalent to the pure 
incentive scheme I. 
Figure 1 illustrates the game assuming, as I did so far, that the portrayed organizations are not 
far-sighted, present value maximizing agents. They are rather perceived as adhering to some 
kind of groping behavior that may, in particular, involve more or less systematic attempts to 
innovate and simple imitation, i.e., behavioral routines that do not imply contemplating 
strategic interaction with the attendant long run consequences. The starting point in Figure 1 
is the situation in which both groups use the mixed incentive scheme with the weight a*.
10 As 
shown above, the best response of group 1 is given by the equation 
12 2 ()m a x ( 1 ( 1 ) , 0 ) aa a n =− − . The evolution as narrated in the text, with group 1 always 
being the organizational innovator and group 2 the imitator, is portrayed by the solid arrows. 
The depicted adjustment path presupposes that group 1 always finds the best response to 
whatever group 2 is doing. If this is not the case, the “adjustment steps” may be of different 
                                                 
10 A numerical example of the whole process starting from the absence of any organization (Hobbesian jungle) 
via the regime in which both groups bank on cooperation, the first adoption of a mixed incentive scheme to fully 
incentivized organizations is provided in the Appendix.    11
size – most likely smaller because groping usually comes with a rather cautions behavior. 
Since for large groups the best response function BR1 of group 1 is very close to the 45
o-line, 
the process of moving to a fully incentivised organization may take a long time.
11 To be sure, 
if group 2 is assumed to be just as innovative as group 1, the process is sped up as indicated 
by the dashed arrows in Figure 1. Our main conclusion, however, remains valid: the trend of 
development towards fully incentivized group organization schemes is a protracted 
evolutionary (discovery) process.  
 
Figure 1: Reaction functions for non-identical sharing rules 
 
4. Conclusions 
This analysis shows that cooperation among the members of competing groups is not 
something we ought to expect. Fundamental contest mechanisms rather suggest that 
incentives will crowd out cooperation as formal group organization schemes. Our 
evolutionary narrative indicates, however, that this crowding-out process is liable to take a 
long time.  
Couching the story in a standard game theoretic framework would of course have been an 
alternative to the evolutionary narrative. Modelling the story as a two-stage game in which the 
                                                 
11 Comparing the shape of the best response function with the one derived by Lee (1995) shows how not 
observing non-negativity constraints may give rise to rather misleading results. Notice, however, that the 








o   12
group formateurs first select one of the feasible organization schemes (N, C, I, M(a)) and the 
group members then choose their individual efforts x would have yielded the same outcome, 
namely the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium  2
1







standard representation does, however, not convey any idea about how the process of 
incentivizing organizations runs its course. Using the evolutionary narrative or inspecting the 
extensive form of the game in a 2x2 set-up (see the numerical example in the appendix) in 
which the group formateurs can either stick with the status quo or implement the most 
profitable next step of organizational innovation reveals  that all regime switches represent 
prisoners’ dilemmas. The sequence of regime switches from (N,N) to (C,C), to the mixed 
incentive regimes M, i.e., (a1=a*,a2=a*), (a*-1/(n-1), a*-1/(n-1)), (a*-2/(n-1), a*-2/(n-1)), and 
so on. down to (I,I) ≡ (a1=0, a2=0) add up to a nested structure of prisoners’ dilemmas that 
resembles the centipede game in which the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium also represents 
the worst outcome. In the one-shot centipede game subjects in experiments never actually 
play the Nash equilibrium, and in our dynamic group contest game probably nobody would 
conjecture that both groups, starting out from the non-cooperative regime (N,N), immediately 
switch to the fully incentivized regime (I,I) that yields much lower payoffs for both 
organizations. Slowly climbing up the game tree from (N,N) to (I,I) is, however, a credible 
development scenario. Moreover, a gradual increase of individual incentives is consonant 
with the empirical evidence. 
The evolutionary process that ratchets up the use of incentives until cooperation completely 
disappears entails an increase in contest effort. If contest effort is socially wasteful (as we 
have assumed here in accordance with the rent-seeking literature), the transition to 
incentivised group organization schemes decreases welfare. If, on the other hand hand, the 
additional effort is not completely dissipated but rather generates positive external effects, as 
is, for example, the case when competition-induced producer effort spills over to the 
consumers, the welfare loss of the producers may be outweighed by the welfare gain of the 
consumers. Be that as it may, the direct effect of providing individual incentives reduces the 
well-being of the group members; and this calls for an explanation as to why incentive 
schemes have become the standard instrument of managing modern organizations. Our 
analysis provides an answer to this puzzle.  
The crowding out of organization schemes that bank on cooperation may also be deplored 
from a purely ethical point of view.  It appears, however, that the benefits from being part of a 
competitive organization and the warm glow that individuals may derive from being in the   13
company of supposedly cooperating peers are to some extent mutually exclusive. This 
incompatibility need not be perfect since it is well known that cooperation among group 
members also occurs in groups using incentive schemes. Gächter et al. (2009), for example, 
show that there is substantial voluntary cooperation in organizations adopting incompletely 
incentive-compatible contracts. Moreover, their experimental study indicates that 
experiencing incentive contracts reduces voluntary cooperation in the short run. Notice, 
however, that this kind of crowding out of cooperation concerns the behavior of the individual 
group members and not the choice behavior of the whole group, represented perhaps by their 
respective formateurs. In my analysis, which focuses on and endogenizes the group 
organization scheme, the behavior of the individual group members is assumed to correspond 
to the Nash equilibrium of the game defined by the adopted organization scheme. In the 
substantial literature on the crowding out of cooperation on the part of individual players, the 
organization scheme is exogenously given and the focus is on the individual group members 
whose behavior can be more or less cooperative. Even though my approach is quite different 
from this literature which is nicely surveyed in Gächter et al. (2009), the fundamental 
question as to why we observe more cooperation than traditional economic analysis predicts is 
common to both lines of investigation. In the context of endogenous organization schemes 
this means that the existence of many organizations still using contractual arrangements that 
leave room for and implicitly solicit cooperation on the part of the individual members needs 
to be explained. My analysis has not aimed at providing an answer to this question. My model 
rather provides an explanation for the puzzling and almost all-encompassing - albeit slow - 
proliferation of incentive schemes in modern societies. 
I have derived the results using the special assumptions that are standard in the rent-seeking 
literature. Analyzing richer models that build on the insight gained from the literature on 
crowding out of individual behavior may reveal the circumstances in which pockets of 
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Appendix: Numerical example 
 




group 1  group 2 
EUi1 EUj2 comment 
no cooperation  no cooperation  4.975  4.975  “Hobbesian jungle” 
cooperation no  cooperation  9.799  0.100  discovery of co-
operation by group 1 
cooperation cooperation  2.5  2.5  imitation by group 2: 
“cooperative regime” 
1 * 0.499 aa ==   cooperation 2.551  2.399 successful first 
incentivization by 
group 1 
1 * aa =   2 * aa =   2.4995 2.4995  imitation by group 2 
1 *1 / 9 9 aa =−   2 * aa =   4.949 0 
1 *1 / 9 9 aa =−   2 *1 / 9 9 aa = −   2.449 2.449 





1 *4 8 / 9 9 aa =−   2 *4 8 / 9 9 aa = −   0.099 0.099 
1 *4 9 / 9 9 aa =−   2 *4 8 / 9 9 aa = −   0.149 0 
1 *4 9 / 9 9 aa =−   2 *4 9 / 9 9 aa = −   0.049 0.049 















1 0 a =   2 0 a =   0.025 0.025  “fully incentivized 
regime” 
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Table 1: Interaction of groups adopting pure organization schemes 
Group 2      
V=1 
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